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Interstate Recognition of Parent-Child
Relationships: The Limits of the State Interests
Paradigm and the Role of Due Process
Steve Sanderst
INTRODUCTION
How secure are the legal relationships between gay or lesbi-
an parents and their children when those families move from one
state to another? This question is only beginning to get serious
attention from courts and commentators.' Questions surrounding
the interstate recognition of same-sex marriages have been the
subject of voluminous commentary for more than a decade. 2 But
what happens when a non-biological parent who has been legally
recognized as a full parent under the laws of one state moves
with her same-sex spouse and their child to a different state
where public policy is unfriendly toward same-sex relationships?
Or what happens when a same-sex couple that adopts a child,
thus becoming its full legal parents, seeks recognition of their
parental status in a different state?
The answers to these questions remain surprisingly uncer-
tain. In this Article, I argue that the law's traditional approaches
to analyzing and resolving interstate disputes cannot be relied
upon to adequately protect the interests of such parents and
children. Instead, courts must be guided by first principles: the
fundamental rights that are inherent in the parent-child rela-
tionship and protected by the Constitution's Due Process Clause.
t Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. I wish to thank
Stijn Van Osch for his research assistance.
1 See generally, for example, Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance: Protectng Les-
bian and Gay Parent Families Across State Lines, 4 Harv L & Pol Rev 31 (2010); Deborah
L. Forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of Gay Marriage,
Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 46 BC L Rev 1 (2004).
2 See, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex
Marriages Cross State Lines (Yale 2006); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage?
Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47
Stan L Rev 499 (1995).
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I refer to the various conflict of laws doctrines I discuss in
this Article, along with the related doctrines of constitutional
and statutory full faith and credit, collectively as the "state in-
terests paradigm." I coin this term to emphasize that these doc-
trines are primarily concerned with mediating relationships be-
tween states and deciding which state's law should prevail in a
conflict. The state interests paradigm stands in contrast to the
paradigm of constitutional litigation, which is concerned with the
rights and interests of the individual vis-a-vis the state. The Su-
preme Court has recognized a parent's entitlement to the care,
custody, and control of her child as a fundamental right protect-
ed against state interference under both the substantive and
procedural branches of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause. Yet, the principles of family autonomy and privacy
the Court has developed over almost a century of Due Process
Clause jurisprudence have been almost entirely absent from
court decisions and scholarly commentary addressing issues of
gay and lesbian parenting. Under the state interests paradigm,
individual rights of the type protected by due process play no role
in the analysis of an interstate problem.3
Roughly one out of every five same-sex couples in the United
States is raising at least one child under the age of eighteen,4 yet
the current legal environment "is one of volatile uncertainty re-
garding the portability of parental rights acquired by same-sex
couples and other alternative families from state to state."5 This
is because "[t]he law as it pertains to same-sex parents is made
up of complications, inconsistencies, and an inadequate body of
legal rights," and there remains in many jurisdictions "stern op-
position to treating same-sex families with the same level of re-
spect and equality as heterosexual or 'normal' families."6 As the
number of same-sex couples who are marrying and parenting
continues to increase, cases involving gay or lesbian family rela-
3 The only role the Supreme Court has specified for the Due Process Clause in con-
flicts litigation is a minimal requirement that, in order for a forum state to apply its own
law to a dispute, the forum "must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fun-
damentally unfair." Allstate Insurance Co v Hague, 449 US 302, 313 (1981) (Brennan)
(plurality). This requirement certainly would be satisfied if a family takes up residence in
a new state and thus becomes subject to its laws.
4 The Williams Institute, Census Snapshot, United States, December 2007, at 2-3,
online at http//www2.law.ucla.edu/wiliamsinstitute/publications/USCensusSnapshot.pdf
(visited Sept 9, 2011).
5 Karen Moulding, 1 Sexual Orientation and the Law§ 1:24 (West 2010).
6 Lissette Gonzalez, Comment, " With Liberty and Justice for All [Families]" The
Modern American Same-Sex Family, 23 St Thomas L Rev 293, 322 (2011).
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tionships will occupy a growing share of state and federal court
dockets. These cases frequently will require courts to enter un-
charted legal territory.
In this Article I argue that the state interests paradigm will
not adequately protect the rights of non-biological parents, and
thus the integrity of gay and lesbian families, but that well-
established constitutional due process principles preclude a state
from refusing to recognize a legal parent-child relationship that
was established earlier in another state. Because the state inter-
ests paradigm does not account in any formal way for the indi-
vidual rights and interests of parents or children, it typically will
be too deferential to anti-gay state public policy arguments that
may be invoked to deny recognition of a parent-child relationship
and thus effectively terminate parental rights without due pro-
cess. When litigation arises over family relationships that cross
state lines and no formal weight is given to the constitutional
rights and interests of parents and children, the litigation suffers
from a structural defect. It is well established that the state may
not intrude without good cause into established relationships
within the nuclear family. Recognizing this principle in litigation
over interstate recognition of parental rights would provide a
necessary corrective to the state interests paradigm and a check
against state interference with extant family relationships.
Scholarly commentary has been wrestling with how law
should make sense of the very concept of parentage at a time
when "new reproductive methodologies and ... changing social
attitudes ... have made the opportunity to generate a family
both feasible and societally acceptable for a greater variety of
couples."7 In particular, a body of commentary, generated by a
small but growing number of cases, has begun to address the
custody and visitation rights of persons who have acted in the
role of parents toward their same-sex partners' biological or
adopted children.8 Custody is not necessarily the same thing as
7 John G. New, Comment, "Aren't You Lucky You Have Two Mamas? hedefining
Parenthood in Light of Evolving Reproductive Technologies and Social Change, 81 Chi
Kent L Rev 773, 805 (2006).
8 See, for example, Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a
Time of Disharmony: Same-Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 Ohio St L J 563 (2009);
Kathryn J. Harvey, Note, The Rights of Divorced Lesbians: Interstate Recognition of
Child Custody Judgments in the Context of Same-Sex Divorce, 78 Fordham L Rev 1379
(2009); Leah C. Battaglioli, Comment, Modified Best Interest Standard: How States
Against Same-Sex Unions Should Adjudicate Child Custody and Visitation Disputes
Between Same-Sex Couples, 54 Cath U L Rev 1235 (2005); Rachel E. Shoaf, Note, Two
Mothers and Their Child: A Look at the Uncertain Status ofNonbiological Lesbian Moth-
ers Under Contemporary Law, 12 Wm & Mary J Women & L 267 (2005).
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legal parenthood, however, and thus many of these cases and
commentaries are concerned with equitable doctrines of "psycho-
logical" or "de facto" parenthood or "in loco parentis" relation-
ships where no actual parent-child relationship was formed un-
der law.9 Moreover, the growing use of more sophisticated repro-
ductive technologies, combined with the "dizzying array" of po-
tential relationships among genetic donors, carriers (who may or
may not be surrogates), and "intended" legal parents (who may
be part of same- or opposite-sex couples), has sometimes "created
confusion about who should be a parent," and "[c]hanging family
relationships have only added to this confusion."10 These are im-
portant issues and debates, but to be clear, my concern in this
Article is not with how legal-parent status is established in the
first instance, but rather with the durability of that status if the
family moves to a new state with different laws and perhaps dif-
ferent social attitudes.
This Article is in three parts. In Part I, I describe how legal
parenthood arises, and the constitutional protections that the
Supreme Court has provided for extant family relationships. In
Part II, I explain how interstate disputes over parent-child rela-
tionships might be resolved under prevailing understandings of
conflict of laws and full faith and credit, and I discuss several
recent cases that illustrate the problems and shortcomings of
these approaches. In Part III, I argue that the state interests
paradigm is inadequate to deal with the interstate problems
posed by contemporary family configurations at a time when
state policies toward gay and lesbian relationships vary widely.
Conflict of laws doctrine is excessively deferential to a forum
state's public policy and could too easily allow a court to effective-
ly terminate a nonbiological parent's rights without due process.
9 See, for example, Kathy T. Graham, Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents,
and Their Childrens Rights as Children, 48 Santa Clara L Rev 999, 1021-26 (2008) (not-
ing that, "in several recent cases, a state court has considered the rights of the non-
natural parent as a psychological or a de facto parent given the relationship the partner
established with the child").
For examples of how courts have addressed such claims, compare Jones v Barlow,
154 P3d 808, 810 (Utah 2007) (holding that a woman with no legal or biological tie to her
partner's child did not have standing to seek visitation after the couple's breakup because
her in loco parentis relationship to the child had ended) with Bethany v Jones, 2011 Ark
67 (holding that a lesbian mother's former partner stood in loco parentis to the child and
that an award of visitation would be in the child's best interest).
10 Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the Game: Parentage Determinations When
Assisted Reproductive Technology Is Used to Create Families, 62 Ark L Rev 29, 29-33
(2009). See also Sonia Bychkov Green, Interstate Intercourse: How Modern Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Challenge the 7Taditional Realn of Conflicts of Law, 24 Wis J
L Gender & Soc'y 25 (2009). .
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And thanks in part to a recent federal circuit split, full faith and
credit doctrine in the area of parentage and adoption is confused
and uncertain. Ultimately, I argue, the Fourteenth Amendment's
well-established protections for extant family relationships pre-
clude a state from refusing to recognize a legal parent-child rela-
tionship that was established under the laws in another state.
Finally, Part IV provides a brief conclusion: parental rights are
individual rights, and thus they must ultimately be vindicated, if
necessary, not through doctrines of conflict of laws or full faith
and credit, but under constitutional guarantees for family priva-
cy and autonomy.
I. LEGAL PARENTHOOD AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
A. How Legal Parenthood Arises
How does one become a legal parent? The answer to that
question is more complicated than it once was," but it is possible
to lay out a few general principles as background to my argu-
ment about interstate recognition. As Joanna Grossman ex-
plains,
[a] legal parent is someone who, by virtue of a particular
tie to a child, is endowed with constitutionally-protected
rights, and subject to potentially onerous obligations. As a
general matter, a biological mother is a legal parent un-
less and until her parental rights are terminated. A bio-
logical father is a legal parent if he is married to the
child's mother at the time of conception or birth, or if
some other criterion for fatherhood is met-such as an ad-
judication or acknowledgment of paternity, or his openly
holding out the child as his own. . . . An adult can also be-
come a legal parent through adoption-a legal process
that creates a full parent-child relationship where one did
not otherwise exist. 12
Note that a biological tie to the father need not necessarily
be proved for that father to be the child's legal parent. Under the
doctrine of the "parentage presumption,"
I' See text accompanying notes 7-10.
12 Joanna L. Grossman, New York's Highest Court Recognizes A Lesbian Co-Parent's
Rights, But Affirms an Unpopular Precedent: Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns,
online at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100511.html (visited Sept 9, 2011).
233] 237
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a child born during a marriage is the child of the mother's
husband. In its modern version, [the parentage presump-
tion] includes children conceived through artificial insem-
ination with donor sperm. This presumptive father has all
the rights and responsibilities of a biological parent, in-
cluding child support and custody/visitation. The pre-
sumption is based on the well-established principle that
children need the stability of two parents and that an in-
dividualized determination of paternity by a court should
not be necessary. Parental obligations are imposed re-
gardless of whether the parents stay together, divorce, or
move to another state.13
Crucial to my argument here, in the six states where same-
sex marriage is now legal (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont), plus the District of
Columbia, the parentage presumption is generally assumed to
apply to same-sex couples, so that "a child born to either spouse
during the marriage would be presumed to be the child of both."14
Assisted reproduction will often play a role here. For example,
imagine that Amanda and Karen live and marry in Massachu-
setts and that Amanda, after alternative insemination or in vitro
fertilization and implantation, bears a child. By virtue of the
marriage, Karen also would become the child's legal parent un-
der Massachusetts law, despite her lack of a biological connec-
tion.'5
The parentage presumption also applies to same-sex couples
in at least six additional states (California, Illinois, Nevada, New
Jersey, Oregon, and Washington) where civil unions or legal do-
mestic partnerships provide the rights and benefits of marriage
13 Jennifer L. Rosato, Children ofSame-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of
the Parentage Presumption, 44 Fain Ct Rev 74, 75 (2006) (citations omitted). For addi-
tional discussion of the parentage presumption as applied to same-sex couples, see Susan
Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Prsumption of Legitimacy in the
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 BU L Rev 227 (2006).
14 Moulding, 1 Sexual Orientation and the Law § 1:24 (cited in note 5). Litigation on
this issue is pending in Iowa, where the state public health department has refused to list
on a birth certificate the wife of a woman who gave birth to a child after the couple had
wed. See Des Moines Women Refile Birth Certificate Lawsuit, Sioux City Journal (Mar 7,
2011), online at http://www.siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/article_9b
f3edbc-48fa-11e0-b02e-001cc4c03286.html (visited Sept 9, 2011).
15 The case that legalized same-sex marriage in Massachusetts cited the "presump-
tions of legitimacy and parentage of children born to a married couple" as one of the mari-
tal benefits that the state could not deny to same-sex couples. Goodridge v Department of
Public Health, 798 NE2d 941, 956 (Mass 2003).
[ 2011:238
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in all but name. 16 For example, while the status of legal marriage
for same-sex couples in California remains in limbo, state law
provides that "[t]he rights and obligations of registered domestic
partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the
same as those of spouses." 7
Finally, in a few states, a person may be deemed a legal par-
ent even in the absence of a formally recognized relationship
with the child's biological parent. At least one state, Delaware,
gives full parental rights by statute to a "de facto" parent-
essentially, a person who lacks a biological tie to the child but
who, with the consent of the actual parent(s), has "established a
bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is paren-
tal in nature." And in California, the state's high court has held
that a woman could be a presumed parent, even without being in
a marriage or other legal same-sex relationship, where she had
"agreed to raise children with her lesbian partner, supported her
partner's artificial insemination using an anonymous donor, and
received the resulting twin children into her home and held them
out as her own."19
B. Constitutional Protections for Parental Rights and Family
Privacy
Extant families whose legal ties have been created by biolo-
gy or state law enjoy a high degree of constitutional protection
against state interference. The protections of the Due Process
Clause for parental rights and family autonomy have their ori-
gins in the Lochner-era cases of Meyer vNebrask 20 and PYerce v
Society of the Sisters.21 Meyer struck down a Nebraska law that
16 Moulding, 1 Sexual Orientation and the Law§ 1:24 (cited in note 5). See also Nan-
cy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for
Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 Stan J Civ Rts & Civ Liber-
ties 201, 215 (2009) (noting that in California, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wash-
ington, as well as the jurisdictions that allow same-sex marriage, "a female spouse or
domestic/civil union partner of a woman who bears a child receives the same presump-
tion of parentage that a husband receives"). The parentage presumption also apparently
applies to civil unions in Illinois, where a law went into effect June 1, 2011 that accords
both same- and opposite-sex couples "the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protec-
tions, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether
they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of
civil or criminal law." 750 ILCS 75/20.
17 Cal Fam Code § 297.5(d) (West 2004).
18 13 Del Code Ann § 8-201(c) (2009).
19 Elisa B. v Superior Court, 117 P3d 660, 662 (Cal 2005).
20 262 US 390.
21 268 US 510.
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prohibited teaching in any language other than English in public
schools, and Pierce invalidated an Oregon law that was aimed at
eliminating parochial schools. The Court grounded both decisions
in the right of parents to control the education and upbringing of
their children. "The child is not the mere creature of the state,"
the Court said in Pierce, and "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the state to standardize its children."22
Meyer and Herce launched a long line of substantive due
process cases explaining and protecting privacy and autonomy in
family and intimate relationships. In 1944, in Prince v Massa-
chusetts,2 3 the Court described a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter,"24 and declared, "[iut is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der."2 5 In 1977, Justice Powell, writing for the plurality in Moore
v City of East Cleveland,26 drew on a string of opinions dating
back to Meyer for the principles that when government "under-
takes ... intrusive regulation of the family ... the usual judicial
deference to the legislature is inappropriate," 27 and that, "when
the government intrudes on choices concerning family living ar-
rangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance
of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which
they are served by the challenged regulation."28 And in 2000,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality in Troxel v Gran-
vile,2 9 called "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children . . . perhaps the oldest of the fundamen-
tal liberty interests recognized by this Court."30
Both the substantive and procedural forms of due process
apply when a state seeks to sever the legal relationship between
parent and child, usually based on a claim by the state that the
parent is unfit. In Santosky vKramer,31 the Supreme Court held
22 Id at 535.
23 321 US 158 (1944).
24 Id at 166.
25 Id.
26 431 US 494 (1977) (Powell) (plurality).
27 Id at 499.
28 Id.
29 530 US 57 (2000) (O'Connor) (plurality).
30 Id at 65.
31 455 US 745 (1982).
[ 2011:240
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that termination of parental rights requires a hearing at which
the state must meet an elevated evidentiary standard of clear
and convincing evidence. 32 As a matter of substantive due pro-
cess, the Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects "freedom of personal choice in matters of family life"33 and
that "parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrieva-
ble destruction of their family life."34 As a matter of procedural
due process, it recognized that, "[w]hen the State moves to de-
stroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures."35 Although the Santosky Court
spoke of "natural parents," it is well established in federal and
state law that, in the legal rights and duties it entails, adoptive
parenthood is indistinguishable from biological parenthood. The
same due process protections for the parent, and the same bur-
dens on the government, apply.36 As one state supreme court has
explained, "adoption ends the parental role of the biological par-
ents and transfers that role to the adoptive parents."37 And, of
course, since Santosky provides a constitutional rule applicable
against all states, it makes no difference if the parent-child rela-
tionship was established in one state but termination is sought
in another.
What about a parent who has neither a biological nor adop-
tive tie to a child, but whose legal relationship to the child arises
from the parentage presumption? The Supreme Court has se-
cured the rights of that type of parent as well, although ironically
it came in a case where the Court was ostensibly upholding tra-
ditional family relationships over newfangled ones. In Michael H
v Gerald D.,38 a married woman, Carole D., bore a child, Victoria,
who had been fathered by Carole's adulterous lover, Michael H.
At various times, both Carole's husband, Gerald, and Michael
held Victoria out as their daughter. Michael filed a filiation ac-
tion in California state court to establish his paternity and visit-
ation rights. The state courts rejected Michael's claims on the
32 Id at 747- 48.
3 Id at 753.
34 Id.
35 Santosky, 455 US at 753-54.
36 See, for example, Smith v Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Re-
form, 431 US 816, 844 n 51 (1977) ("Adoption .. . is recognized as the legal equivalent of
biological parenthood."); Ellis v Hamilton, 669 F2d 510, 513 (7th Cir 1982) ("Adoptive
parents have all the legal rights, and generally the same emotional stake, in their chil-
dren as natural parents.").
3 In re Adoption of a Child by D.MH, 641 A2d 235, 244 (NJ 1994).
38 491 US 110 (1989) (Scalia) (plurality).
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basis of the parentage presumption-specifically, a state eviden-
tiary rule that "the [child] of a wife cohabiting with her husband,
who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a
child of the marriage."39
The Supreme Court upheld the California courts' decisions.
Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia rebuffed Michael's claim of
a "liberty interest" that was "created by biological fatherhood
plus an established parental relationship."40 Justice Scalia char-
acterized the Court's parental rights and family privacy cases as
instead protecting "the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would
not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relation-
ships that develop within the unitary family."41 Substantive due
process did not protect a "natural father [who] assert[s] parental
rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with
another man."4 2 Instead, legal tradition protected established
family units like the one consisting of Gerald, Carole, and Victo-
ria against interlopers like Michael, notwithstanding Gerald's
lack of a biological tie to the child.
Of course, like any individual right, parental rights under
the Due Process Clause are not absolute. For example, in Prince
v Massachusetts,43 the Court upheld the application of child la-
bor laws to a nine-year-old who was soliciting on behalf of her
religion at the direction of her parents. The principle was that
the state, acting as parens patriae, may act to prevent harm or
exploitation of children even if it conflicts with the parents' au-
thority. Moreover, in other cases the Court "has noted that the
rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities
they have assumed,"44 indicating that constitutional protection
for parental rights serves "the paramount interest in the welfare
of children."45 But the circumstances in which a state may inter-
vene between parent and child are narrowly limited, and the
Court recently underscored that "so long as a parent adequately
cares for his or her children ... there will normally be no reason
for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family"
or to displace the presumption that the parent is in the position
9 Id at 115, citing Cal Evid Code Ann § 621(a) (West Supp 1989).
40 MichaelH, 491 US at 123.
41 Id.
42 Id at 125.
43 321 US 158 (1944).
44 LeAr vRobertson, 463 US 248, 257 (1983).
45 Id.
242 [ 2011:
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"to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that par-
ent's children."46
In summary, parental rights may arise in a variety of ways
under state law, but the Supreme Court's Due Process Clause
jurisprudence going back almost 100 years protects the parent-
child relationship, once formed, against termination without
good cause or other unwarranted state interference.
II. THE STATE INTERESTS PARADIGM AND INTERSTATE DISPUTES
OVER PARENTAL RIGHTS
The United States is a highly mobile society. Between two
and three percent of Americans move to a different state each
year,47 and families frequently relocate away from the state
where a marriage was celebrated or a child was born or adopted.
As more same-sex couples formalize their relationships and de-
cide to raise children-nearly 50,000 same-sex couples already
have wed since 20044 8-Courts will increasingly be confronted
with difficult questions about whether these family relationships
endure across state lines. Parents exercise care and legal author-
ity for their children in countless transactions of daily life. Dis-
putes may arise, for example, if a school, hospital, or insurance
company refuses to acknowledge the status or authority of a non-
biological same-sex parent. In this Section, I explore interstate
recognition of parenthood under the state interests paradigm.
Specifically, I discuss the limitations of both traditional conflict
of laws doctrine and federal full faith and credit principles for
protecting parental rights.
A. Background
Until the advent of marriage and other forms of legally rec-
ognized same-sex relationships, there were seldom any serious
questions about whether a legal-parent relationship that had
been established in one state would be recognized in another. Of
course, some types of family controversies implicated the laws of
more than one state-for example, uniform acts were promulgat-
46 7-oxel, 530 US at 68-69.
4 See Haya El Nasser and Paul Overberg, Millions more Americans move to new
states, USA TODAY, Nov 30, 2007, online at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-
11-29-MobilityN.htm (visited Sept 9, 2011) (citing US census data).
48 See graph of data from the Williams Institute at UCLA Law School, online at
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/11/137763596/lesbian-couples-boosting-gay-marriage-numb
ers (visited Sept 9, 2011).
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ed to deal with questions of paternity49 and with interstate
recognition of child custody orders following divorce.50 But for the
most part, conflicts authorities did not address the interstate
recognition of parental relationships-other than perhaps a few
pages devoted to "legitimacy" and its consequences for the inher-
itance rights of children born out of wedlock 5 .- because there
was no need to do so. "[C]hildren had two easily identifiable par-
ents: a mother who gave birth to the child and a father who was
married to that mother."52 Although the growing use of more so-
phisticated assisted reproductive technologies has begun to chal-
lenge this simple state of affairs, 53 it is safe to say that, until
quite recently, parenting was generally assumed to involve het-
erosexuals; heterosexual parents were legally presumed to be
capable of natural reproduction; and heterosexuals' relationships
with their children were presumed to be secure absent a finding
of unfitness or serious harm to the child.
Similarly, where adoptive children were concerned, while in-
terstate disputes might sometimes arise about the jurisdiction of
the court that granted the adoption,54 it was uncontroversial
hornbook law that "[a]n adoption decree entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction will ordinarily be recognized every-
where."55 Adoptive parents could move about the country secure
that their relationships to their children would not be questioned
from state to state.
In short, heteronormativity, natural reproduction, and a
high degree of deference to traditional family relationships all
made it unnecessary for courts and scholars to develop a modern
body of conflicts principles to deal with the interstate recognition
49 See generally Uniform Parentage Act (amended 2002), online at
http://www.1aw.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm (visited Sept 9, 2011).
50 See generally Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997),
online at http: //www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uccjea/finall997act.htm (visited
Sept 9, 2011).
51 See, for example, Eugene F. Scoles, et al, Conflict of Laws H§ 16.1-16.3 (Thomson
West 4th ed 2004).
52 Anderson, 62 Ark L Rev at 29 (cited in note 10).
53 See text accompanying note 10. For a discussion of how assisted reproduction
implicates some of the same interstate recognition issues as same-sex parenting, see
generally Joslin, 70 Ohio St L J 563 (cited in note 8). The New York Times recently ex-
plored a complicated modern family relationship involving a birth mother, her sperm
donor, their child, and the sperm donor's male partner. See N.R. Kleinfield, Baby Makes
Four, and Complications, NY Times MB1 (June 19, 2011).
54 See Scoles, Conflict ofLaws at § 16.5 (cited in note 51).
55 Id at § 16.6.
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of parent-child relationships. Such recognition was simply as-
sumed.
B. The Parent-Child Relationship as a Conflict of Laws Prob-
lem
The growing visibility and acceptance of gay/lesbian rela-
tionships poses a serious challenge to traditional conflicts doc-
trine. A leading family law scholar writes that, while gays and
lesbians have made "critical advancements in the struggle to
achieve full and equal protection" for their right to form families,
their children
are still in an extremely tenuous legal position. Currently,
even when one state views both members of a same-sex
couple as legal parents, this legal parental status is not
secure when the family moves about the country. Many
states likely will continue to view the nonbirth parent as
a legal stranger to the child, possibly without any rights
or obligations with respect to the child.56
Perhaps the most important reason that interstate recogni-
tion of gay/lesbian parental rights remains uncertain is that
courts likely will view such recognition as inextricably inter-
twined with recognition of the underlying relationship between
the parents. The number of jurisdictions that allow same-sex
couples to form marriages or other legally sanctioned relation-
ships remains small: as of this writing, six states plus the Dis-
trict of Columbia allow equal marriage, while six others provide
civil unions or domestic partnerships that include the same
state-conferred benefits and responsibilities as marriage.57 At the
same time, a majority of states not only refuse to create same-sex
marriages, they actually purport to nullify such marriages when
the couples enter their borders. Forty-one states currently pro-
hibit same-sex marriage by statute or constitutional amend-
ment5 8 (these laws are commonly referred to as mini-Defense of
56 Joslin, 4 Harv L & Pol Rev at 33 (cited in note 1). See also Joanna L. Grossman,
When Same-Sex Couples Adopt: Problems of Interstate Recognition, online at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090609.html (visited Sept 9, 2011).
57 See Lambda Legal, Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, online at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relation
ships.html (visited Sept 9, 2011).
58 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions
and Domestic Partnerships, online at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (vis-
ited Sept 9, 2011).
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Marriage Acts, or "mini-DOMAs"), and based on their language,
most of the mini-DOMAs also would void or deny recognition to
perfectly valid same-sex marriages from other states.59 Moreover,
some of the nonrecognition laws are drafted broadly to also pre-
clude recognition of civil unions, domestic partnerships, or any
other form of same-sex relationship.60
Again, imagine that Amanda and Karen live and marry in
Massachusetts, and Amanda bears a child. Karen is a legal par-
ent under Massachusetts law. Amanda and Karen then pull up
stakes and move to a mini-DOMA state such as Virginia. 61 The
Virginia constitution provides that "only a union between one
man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by
this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions." 6 2 So it is clear
that Virginia will not recognize Amanda and Karen's marriage.
But will the state recognize Karen's parental rights-rights that
arose as a legal incident of her Massachusetts marriage? What
happens if Karen needs to make medical or educational decisions
for the child and is denied the ability to do so? Or what happens
if the couple later separates and Karen seeks joint custody?
Would a Virginia court recognize her as a full and equal parent?
Put another way, does the parentage presumption survive the
move from an equal-marriage state to a mini-DOMA state? That
critical question remains unanswered in reported cases. But,
perhaps owing to the harshness of the mini-DOMAs passed in
recent years and their categorical denial of any legal rights to
same-sex couples, 63 many commentators appear to assume that
- See Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil
Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U Pa L Rev 2143, 2149-50 (2005).
60 See, for example, Va Const Art I, § 15-A, which provides that "only a union be-
tween one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this Com-
monwealth and its political subdivisions," and further provides that
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize
a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approx-
imate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this
Commonwealth or its political subdivisions create or recognize another union,
partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, obli-
gations, qualities, or effects of marriage.
61 Lest there be any confusion, in this Article I am only concerned with nonbiological
parents who have acquired their parental rights under the law of a state where they were
actually domiciled at the time. I do not address whether enforceable parental rights arise
by virtue of an "evasive" marriage, where the couple leaves home temporarily to obtain a
marriage they could not get in their own state of domicile. The law traditionally has
looked with disfavor on marriage-law evasion, and I do not argue that such marriages
should give rise to rights that other states must respect.
62 Va Const Art I, § 15-A.
63 See, for example, Andrew Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38
246 [ 2011:
HeinOnline  -- 2011 U. Chi. Legal F. 246 2011
PARENT- CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
the parental rights of someone like Karen would not be honored
in a mini-DOMA state, and that children born into same-sex re-
lationships will be "subject to fluctuating legal relationships
based only on geographical location."64
The anxiety of nonbiological parents over the durability of
their parental status, and the suspicion that some states may
refuse to recognize two members of the same sex as a child's le-
gal parents, were underscored in a recent New York adoption
case. In In re Adoption of Sebastian,65 two women, Ingrid and
Mona, were legally married in the Netherlands and sought to
start a family. Mona's ova were fertilized in vitro by an anony-
mous sperm donor, and an ovum was implanted in Ingrid's uter-
us. Their child, Sebastian, was born nine months later. Ingrid
and Mona's marriage was recognized under New York law, and
thus, "as the child of a married couple, Sebastian already ha[d] a
recognized and protected child/parent relationship with both In-
grid," the birth mother, and Mona, her wife.66 Nonetheless, the
court noted pointedly that "the same recognition and protection
of Mona's parental rights does not currently exist in the rest of
this country."67 Accordingly, the court approved Mona's petition
to adopt Sebastian. Although such an adoption of a child by his
legal parent was "arguably ... unnecessary and ... duplica-
tive,"68 the court was persuaded that "the best interests of this
child require a judgment [granting adoption] that will ensure
recognition of both Ingrid and Mona as his legal parents
throughout the entire United States."69 It should be noted that
many same-sex couples would not have the same option as Ingrid
and Mona, since second-parent adoptions are only available in 16
states and the District of Columbia. 70
Of course, a heterosexual couple would not face the same di-
lemma as Ingrid and Mona because their marriage would be rec-
ognized everywhere. All states subscribe to the so-called "place of
Loyola U Chi L J 265, 265 (2007) ("Some of the consequences of these laws are surprising.
Some are so harsh and irrational as to make the laws unconstitutional.").
64 Linda S. Anderson, Protecting Parent-Child Relationships: Determining Parental
Rights of Same-Sex Parents Consistently Despite Varying Recognition of Their Relation-
ship, 5 Pierce L Rev 1, 3 (2007).
65 879 NYS2d 677 (NY Sur 2009).
66 Id at 682.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 In re: Adoption ofSebastian, 879 NYS2d at 692-93.
70 See Human Rights Campaign, Parenting Laws: Joint Adoption, online at
http://www.hrc.org/documents/parentinglaws-maps.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011).
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celebration rule," which holds that the validity of a marriage
should be conclusively determined by the law of the state where
it was celebrated and not questioned or redetermined in a new
state. As one state high court explained in a classic statement of
the rule, "[i]t is desirable that there should be uniformity in the
recognition of the marital status, so that persons legally married
according to the laws of one State will not be held to be living in
adultery in another State, and that children begotten in lawful
wedlock in one State will not be held illegitimate in another."71
The rule "confirms the parties' expectations, it provides stability
in an area where stability (because of children and property) is
very important, and it avoids the potentially hideous problems
that would arise if the legality of a marriage varied from state to
state."72
Although it is supported by powerful, sensible policies and
human values-promoting certainty and stability in legal rela-
tionships, vindicating justified expectations, preventing the cas-
ual evasion of legal duties-the place of celebration rule has an
escape mechanism: the so-called "public policy exception," under
which a state may refuse to recognize a marriage if that mar-
riage violates its strong public policy. 7 3 The public policy excep-
tion in conflict of laws has been criticized as "a substitute for the
intellectual exertion necessary to find appropriate factors" for
choice of law decisionS74 and as "a relic carried over from interna-
tional law without reflection on the changes in interstate rela-
tions wrought by the Constitution."75 Conflicts scholar Larry
Kramer argues that, when used to deny recognition to same-sex
marriages, the public policy exception is unconstitutional. 76
Nonetheless, until the Supreme Court either strikes down all
anti-gay marriage laws, or recognizes the absurdity of a regime
where same-sex couples can be simultaneously married and un-
married in different states,77 there is no barrier against a state
71 Henderson vHenderson, 87 A2d 403, 408 (Md App 1952).
72 William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws
402 (Lexis 3d ed 2002).
7 For discussion of the history and operation of the public policy exception concern-
ing same-sex marriages, see Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States 12-27 (cited in note
2).
74 Holly Sprague, Comment, Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell to Comity and Public
Policy, 74 Cal L Rev 1447, 1452 (1986) (citation omitted).
7 Keane, 47 Stan L Rev at 515 (cited in note 2).
76 See generally Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Un-
constitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 Yale L J 1965 (1997).
7 I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court should do so. See Steve Sanders,
The right to marry, and the right to remain married, SCOTUSBlog (Aug 23, 2011), online
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insisting on the power to unilaterally nullify the marriage of a
same-sex couple that migrates into its borders.78 The place of
celebration rule may provide as an aspirational principle that all
states should recognize each other's marriages, but conflicts doc-
trine has no external enforcement mechanisms; in the absence of
some right protected by the Constitution or other federal law, a
state court is bound to apply its own state's statutory law or an
interpretation thereof.
When litigation arises in a mini-DOMA state over parental
rights acquired in another state under the parentage presump-
tion, the party opposing recognition may argue that, if a state's
statutory public policy bars recognition of the parents' relation-
ship, the same public policy also should bar recognition of paren-
tal rights that arose as a legal incident of that relationship. A
court in a mini-DOMA state may well reason that, if its state's
mini-DOMA can purport to convert duly married spouses into
legal strangers when they cross state lines, then the same public
policy can do the same with a child and her non-biological par-
ent.
The Alabama Supreme Court suggested the possibility of
such an outcome last year in Ex parte NB.79 That case involved
a dispute between two former lesbian partners: "N.B.," the bio-
logical parent, and "A.K.," the partner who jointly raised the
couple's child and sought visitation after the breakup. The family
had lived in California, but N.B. and the child later moved to Al-
abama. N.B. filed a custody petition in Alabama juvenile court,
claiming she "feared that A.K. was going to kidnap the child."80
Shortly thereafter, A.K. obtained a California court order recog-
nizing her as the child's second legal parent, even though A.K.
and N.B. had never formalized their relationship.81 The Alabama
at http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-right-to-marry-and-the-right-to-remain-marri
ed/ (visited Sept 9, 2011).
78 I have argued elsewhere that traditional conflicts doctrine "does not deal sensibly
with the new challenge of same-sex matrimony" and that "courts should recognize a right
of marriage recognition, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause,
which would protect same-sex couples from this kind of harmful and unwarranted dis-
crimination." Steve Sanders, The Case for a Right of Marriage Recognition: Why Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Should Protect Same-Sex Couples Who Change States,
Findlaw.com (July 9, 2008), online at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/
20080709_sanders.html (visited Sept 9, 2011).
79 2010 WL 2629064 (Ala).
8o Id at *2.
81 The California court relied on Elisa B, 117 P3d 660 (cited at note 19), which held
that in certain circumstances a woman could qualify as a presumed parent even in the
absence of a formalized relationship with the child's biological mother.
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trial court refused to recognize the California court's order; the
intermediate appellate court reversed, and N.B. appealed.
Rather than resolve the merits of the dispute, the Alabama
Supreme Court threw out the case on jurisdictional grounds:
N.B. had failed to name A.K. as a defendant in her original juve-
nile court petition and thus could not litigate A.K.'s legal rights. 82
Nonetheless, in dicta, the court noted that Alabama law provides
that "[m]arriage is inherently a unique relationship between a
man and a woman" and that "[a] union replicating marriage of or
between persons of the same sex ... shall be considered and
treated in all respects as having no legal force or effect in this
state."8 3 Thus, it said, "questions regarding the judgment of the
California trial court and its enforceability in Alabama may exist
in light of the unequivocal nature of Alabama public policy on the
issue presented by this case." 4 In other words, had it reached the
merits, the Alabama high court might well have decided that its
state's anti-gay public policy trumped the rights A.K. had estab-
lished as a presumed parent under California law. Indeed, in
light of the court's discussion of Alabama's marriage law, that
result might have occurred even if N.B. and A.K. had been legal-
ly married when the child was born.
On the other hand, a court might observe, as an Ohio appel-
late court recently did in another visitation-rights case involving
a lesbian couple, that its state mini-DOVIA simply "says nothing
about parenting or children" and thus is no impediment to recog-
nizing the rights of a nonbiological same-sex parent.85
Given the uncertainty of how a public policy exception in-
tended for marriage should apply to parents and children, deci-
sions in such cases may ultimately hinge on judges' own ideolo-
gies and attitudes toward gay/lesbian family relationships, and
their willingness to balance the interests of the specific family in
front of them against the politics and social attitudes of their
state. Even if a court is willing to put aside the question of the
parents' relationship and focus on the relationship between the
non-biological parent and child, judges and lawyers will not find
much in their conflicts treatises to guide them.
82 Ex Parte N.B., 2010 WL 2629064 at *5.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 In re LaPiana, 2010 WL 3042394, *10 (Ohio App) (holding that a grant of visitation
to the former female partner of the biological mother of two children was in the children's
best interest).
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The closest that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws appears to come to addressing interstate recognition of
parent-child relationships is in its discussion of "legitimacy,"
which is defined as "the legal kinship between a child and its
parent or parents."86 The Restatement provides that, "[glenerally
speaking, the law favors the status of legitimacy over that of ille-
gitimacy. As a result, a status of legitimacy once created . . . will
usually be recognized as continuing to exist in the face of subse-
quent events, such as a change of domicil by the parties."87 Simi-
larly, in a 1933 article on The Status of the Child and the Con-
flict of Laws, Joseph Beale, the father of the first Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, said that, if a child is "legitimated by the proper
law, the status will be everywhere recognized."88
Although the upshot of these authorities would seem to be
that the legal kinship between a parent and child, once estab-
lished in any state, must be respected in every other state, a rule
based solely on the law of legitimacy may not prove persuasive to
modern courts. First, this rule too could be subject to the public
policy exception. Second, in modern understanding, the status of
legitimacy is not generally thought to be the same thing as the
existence, ve] non, of a legal parent-child relationship. American
courts long ago abandoned the draconian rule of English common
law that a child of unmarried parents was "nullius filius"-a le-
gal stranger to both of them.89 Instead, courts reasoned that legal
duties of custody and support arose from the parents' "responsi-
bility for having brought [the child] into being," and that this
rationale "is equally persuasive" whether the parents were mar-
ried or not.90 As a result, legitimacy as a legal issue came to be
concerned mostly with rights of inheritance or the ability to sue
for a parent's wrongful death or to claim certain public benefits,
not the parent's basic rights and duties concerning the child's
care, custody, and control.9' Still, since the concept of legitimacy
86 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) § 287 comment a.
87 Id at comment d.
88 Joseph H. Beale, The Status of the Child and the Conflict of Laws, 1 U Chi L Rev
13, 18 (1933).
89 See Doughty v Engler, 211 P 619, 619 (Kan 1923) (discussing the English common
law's treatment of illegitimacy).
90 Id at 620.
91 The legal relevance of illegitimacy further declined when the Supreme Court ruled
that discrimination against illegitimate children violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Holding that illegitimate children were entitled to recover state benefits for the wrongful
death of their mother, the Court, through Justice Douglas, observed, "These children,
though illegitimate, were dependent on [their mother]; she cared for them and nurtured
them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense." Levy v Louisi-
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is the closest analogue in conflicts doctrine to the question of a
parent-child relationship, courts should give careful considera-
tion to the traditional rule that a personal status endures across
state lines.
Where no specific rule is provided for a particular conflicts
situation, the Second Restatement says that a court should con-
sider the following factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant poli-
cies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certain-
ty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in
the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied.92
Many of these factors clearly weigh in favor of recognizing a
parent-child relationship for the sake of comity between states.
After all, the needs of the interstate system, the protection of
justified expectations, and the basic policies underlying family
law all are advanced by continuity and stability in legal relation-
ships, especially where children are involved. Moreover, a state
that creates a legal parent-child relationship has an interest in
seeing that relationship respected and protected as something
fundamental and permanent. A rule that parental rights endure
from state to state would provide "certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result" and would be easy to apply.
But comity between states appears to carry little weight
where novel questions of family law are concerned, and courts
adjudicating such questions may be unlikely to sacrifice the poli-
cies of their own states to advance abstract multistate values like
certainty and predictability. 9 3 Based on an extensive historical
survey of conflicts cases, Lynn Wardle has written that, in "inter-
jurisdictional conflicts concerning recognition of controversial
forms of domestic relations[,] . . . protection of the strong domes-
ana, 391 US 68, 72 (1968).
92 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6.
9 As one commentator has observed, "[t]he courts of each state are active partici-
pants in the formulation and implementation of local policies. To place in their hands
extensive responsibility for deciding when those policies will yield to and when they will
prevail over competing policies of sister states seems unsound." William F. Baxter, Choice
ofLaw and the Federal System, 16 Stan L Rev 1, 23 (1963).
252 [ 2011:
HeinOnline  -- 2011 U. Chi. Legal F. 252 2011
PARENT- CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
tic relations policy of the forum sovereign is the dominant, con-
trolling consideration."94 Although respect for established rela-
tionships was an "influential consideration[ ]" and comity was a
"presumption," in the end, "when recognition of a novel form of
domestic relations would directly contradict or seriously impair
or defy a strong public policy of the forum sovereign regarding
domestic relations, that consideration consistently controlled the
outcome." 95 Indeed, Wardle himself concludes that "the resolu-
tion of questions about the importation into one state of new
forms and controversial forms of domestic relationships created
in another sovereign is not really a matter of, or appropriate for,
conflicts analysis."96 It is, rather, "a political, even ideological
problem."97
The tradition of deference toward each state's power over its
own family law also is reflected in the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), which was intended by its drafters "to create uniformity
in the law as it pertained to children born to unmarried parents"
(a category that presumably would include same-sex couples
whose marriages are not legally recognized in a new domicile)
and to "address modern issues of parentage including the grow-
ing use of reproductive technologies."98 In its choice of law sec-
tion, the UPA simply provides that a "court shall apply the law of
[its own] State to adjudicate the parent-child relationship. The
applicable law does not depend on: (1) the place of birth of the
child; or (2) the past or present residence of the child."99 Its fail-
ure to protect the durability of parental rights against hostile
laws in a new domicile is only one way that the "pressing need to
develop the legal definition of the term 'parent' to encompass
same-sex couples remains unfulfilled" in the UPA. 00
94 Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Maniage: Comity Versus Public Policy
in Inter-Jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations, 2008 BYU L Rev
1855, 1903-04 (2008).
95 Id at 1904.
96 Id at 1920.
97 Id (citation and quotation omitted).
98 Gonzalez, Comment, 23 St Thomas L Rev at 298 (cited in note 6).
99 Uniform Parentage Act, § 103(b) (National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws 2002), online at http/www.law.upen.edu/blVarchivetuk/upa/
final2002.htm (visited Sept 9, 2011).
100 Gonzalez, Comment, 23 St Thomas L Rev at 299 (cited in note 6).
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C. Parental Rights under Federal Requirements of Full Faith
and Credit
To this point I have focused on how an interstate dispute
about parental rights might be resolved under traditional conflict
of laws doctrine. But there will be times when the Constitution's
Full Faith and Credit Clause, or federal legislation enacted pur-
suant to that clause, also is relevant. In this Section I discuss
several recent high-profile cases that illustrate the ambiguities
in how full faith and credit applies to (1) court orders concerning
parentage (which typically will arise in the context of divorce
from a marriage or dissolution of a civil union or domestic part-
nership where the parents are contesting child custody), and (2)
adoptions by same-sex couples. But first, some background on
the Full Faith and Credit Clause will be helpful.
1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Article IV, Section 1 provides that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judi-
cial Proceedings of every other State."101 In a seminal commen-
tary on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Justice Robert Jackson
wrote that, in adopting the provision, the framers "sought to fed-
eralize the separate and independent state legal systems" and
"guard the new political and economic union against the disinte-
grating influence of provincialism in jurisprudence."102 Similarly,
the Supreme Court has said that "[t]he very purpose of the full-
faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several
states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore
obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings
of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single na-
tion."103
As these explanations indicate, the original purpose of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause was to mediate relations among the
states, not to protect individual rights or mediate the relation-
ship between the state and the individual. Of course, the Consti-
tution's structural and federalism provisions are commonly
thought to help protect individual liberty by regulating and
channeling government authority and providing checks against
101 US Const Art IV, § 1.
102 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 45 Colum L Rev 1, 17 (1945) (citation omitted).
103 Mlwaukee County vME. White Co, 296 US 268, 276-77 (1935).
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concentrations of government power. But be this as it may, the
purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not to protect the
rights of individuals but rather to underscore the equal power
and dignity of each state and to "balance[ ] conflicting state in-
terests by commanding that the states respect the sovereignty of
sister states in a federal context."104
Under the Supreme Court's modern interpretation of the
clause, the requirement of full faith and credit is quite weak
when a state is asked to honor another state's public policy. The
Court has reasoned that one state is not required to "substitute
the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a
subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate." 05
Thus, "[clourts have discretion as to whether to defer to sister
states' statutes and legal precedents, or whether to apply the
standards dictated by their own state's statutes and their own
legal precedents. The decision to defer is an exercise of comity-
respect for sister states-not a constitutional obligation."106 This
principle explains why, although the Supreme Court has never
considered the question, it is conventional wisdom among con-
flicts scholars that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not re-
quire one state to recognize another state's same-sex marriage,
because a marriage is created under a statutory licensing
scheme, not by a court judgment.107 As I will explain below, the
full faith and credit requirement is much stronger for final judg-
ments by a court.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause also contains implement-
ing language that gives Congress the power "by general Laws [to]
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."108 Although Con-
gress has not often legislated pursuant to this power, it has done
so in two ways that are relevant to my concerns in this Article.
First, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 09 (PKPA), passed
in 1980, requires "appropriate authorities of every State [to] en-
force according to its terms and [not to] modify except as provid-
ed in [the Act] any child custody determination made ... by a
104 Eugene F. Scoles, et al, Conflict ofLaws 150 (Thompson West 4th ed 2004).
105 Pacific Employers Ins Co v Indus Accident Commission, 306 US 493, 501 (1939).
106 Joanna L. Grossman, New York's Eghest Court Recognizes A Lesbian Co-Parent's
Rights, But AffInns an Unpopular Precedent: Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns,
online at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100511.htm1 (visited Sept 9, 2011).
107 See, for example, Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 Creighton L Rev 353, 358 (2005).
108 US Const Art IV, § 1.
109 28 USC § 1738(A).
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court of another State."110 In other words, where a court deter-
mines child custody arrangements in the context of a divorce or
other legal separation, the PKPA is intended to prevent a spouse
who is aggrieved by the terms of a custody order from seizing the
child and seeking a different decision in another state. Second,
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), passed in 1996, provides
that no state is "required to give effect to any public act, record,
or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a rela-
tionship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State ... or a right or
claim arising from such relationship."1 ' In other words, accord-
ing to Congress, even if Iowa wants to create same-sex marriag-
es, Indiana is not required under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to recognize them.
2. The PKPA and children of same-sex relationships.
In theory, if a court has jurisdiction to render a custody or-
der, the PKPA means that order should be respected by courts in
all other states regardless of whether it involves an opposite- or
same-sex couple. But the PKPA and its command of full faith
and credit only come into play when a family is breaking up; they
have no relevance for an intact family that is simply changing
their state of domicile. A recent high-profile case involving a les-
bian couple, Miller-Jenkins v Miller-Jenkins,112 illustrates the
PKPA's operation and limitations.
Janet and Lisa Miller-Jenkins entered into a Vermont civil
union (a status that Vermont provided for same-sex couples be-
fore full marriage was legalized in that state in 2009). Lisa was
artificially inseminated and gave birth to a child, "I.M.J." The
couple later separated, and Lisa moved to Virginia, taking I.M.J.
with her. Janet remained in Vermont. A Vermont family court
dissolved the civil union and, pursuant to Vermont law, awarded
Janet visitation rights of "parent-child contact."113
Unhappy with this arrangement, Lisa sought to defeat the
Vermont family court order by filing a parentage action in Vir-
ginia. A Virginia trial court subsequently declared Lisa "the sole
biological and natural parent" of I.M.J., with exclusive "legal
110 28 USC § 1738(A)(a).
111 28 USC § 1738(C).
112 637 SE2d 330 (Va App 2006).
113 Id at 332.
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rights, privileges, duties and obligations as parent." 14 The trial
court denied Janet "any claims of parentage or visitation rights"
over I.M.J.11s
Upon learning of Lisa's petition, the Vermont court entered
an order reasserting its jurisdiction over "all parent-child contact
issues" and stating that it would not "defer to a different State
that would preclude the parties from a remedy."116 The Vermont
court ultimately held Lisa in contempt for refusing to comply
with its visitation order, and the Vermont Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that under the PKPA, Vermont had preemptive
jurisdiction to determine Janet's parental and visitation
rights. 1 7
In this classic conflict of laws standoff between two states,
Virginia finally blinked. Its court of appeals agreed that, in light
of the PKPA, Virginia could not "deny full faith and credit to the
orders of the Vermont court regarding I.M.J.'s custody and visit-
ation.""8 The Virginia Supreme Court declined to hear an ap-
peal.
This result in Miller-Jenkins was undoubtedly correct, but it
depended entirely on the fact that Janet's parental rights had
been adjudicated under a sister state's court order. The PKPA's
full faith and credit command does not help non-biological gay or
lesbian parents in other contexts. For example, what if instead of
breaking up, Janet, Lisa, and I.M.J. had all moved together as a
happy family from Vermont to Virginia, and Janet needed to
make medical or educational decisions for I.M.J.? If a hospital or
school denied her the ability to do so and the family went to
court, would a Virginia court recognize Janet as I.M.J.'s legal
parent? Nothing in the court of appeals' decision indicates that a
lower court would have been required to do so. Under current
law, it is clear that Virginia could refuse to recognize Lisa and
Janet's civil union-indeed, its state constitution declares just
such a policy.119 In light of Virginia's hostility toward legal
recognition of same-sex relationships in any form, it seems quite
14 Id.
115 Id.
116 Miller-Jenkins, 637 SE2d at 333.
117 Id.
118 Id at 337.
119 Va Const Art I, § 15-A (providing that "only a union between one man and one
woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized" and that "[t]his Commonwealth and its
political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of un-
married individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or
effects of marriage").
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possible that a Virginia court might deny Janet legal-parent sta-
tus as well.
It is a bedrock principle of modern conflicts doctrine that a
state is entitled to apply its law to its own domiciliaries. There-
fore, although Vermont considered Janet to be I.M.J.'s parent.by
virtue of Janet's civil union with Lisa, a Virginia court might
reason that, once the family becomes domiciled in Virginia, it is
Virginia's laws that determine their legal status. If Virginia does
not recognize the civil union, then it might also refuse to recog-
nize a parent-child relationship that arose solely as an incident
of that civil union. Under the state interests paradigm, in the
absence of an out-of-state court order that Virginia was required
by federal law to honor, Virginia would be free to apply its own
law without taking into account any right Janet might have to
her established legal-parent relationship with I.M.J.
Indeed, some courts might find that their state's public poli-
cy against same-sex relationships is so strong that it even
trumps a court order from another state. Recall that in Ex Parte
NB., the Alabama case with strong parallels to Miller-Jenkins
discussed in Part II.B. above, the Alabama Supreme Court indi-
cated that its state's anti-gay marriage law might prohibit recog-
nition of a legal parent-child relationship established under Cali-
fornia law, even if it meant rejecting the parentage determina-
tion of a California court to which the PKPA arguably applied. 120
Although it would seem that a state court that ignored the
full faith and credit requirements of the PKPA would be in viola-
tion of the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court has held that
the PKPA does not give an aggrieved parent an implied cause of
action in federal court. In Thompson v Thompson,121 the Court
essentially said states must simply be trusted to enforce the
PKPA,122 and should they fail to do so, "Congress may choose to
revisit the issue."123 The fact that an individual plaintiff cannot
sue for a state's violation of the PKPA further underscores the
limitations of full faith and credit as a component of the state
interests paradigm for analyzing interstate disputes over paren-
tal rights. The PKPA is "a mandate directed to state courts to
120 Ex Parte N.B., 2010 WL 2629064, *5 (Ala).
121 484 US 174 (1988).
122 See id at 187 ("[The unspoken presumption in petitioner's argument is that the
States are either unable or unwilling to enforce the provisions of the Act. This is a pre-
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respect the custody decrees of sister States," 24 and the affected
parent essentially sits on the sidelines while her rights are rec-
ognized or not.
3. Recognition of adoptions by same-sex couples.
As I explained above, the constitutional command of full
faith and credit does not mean that a forum state is required to
substitute the statutory or decisional law of another state for its
own.125 By contrast, final judgments by courts get the strongest
form of full faith and credit.126 As the Supreme Court explained
in Baker v General Motors Corp,127 "[R]egarding judgments ...
the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment
in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority
over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment,
qualifies for recognition throughout the land."128 A judgment by a
court in State A might produce a legal outcome that State B dis-
agrees with if State B becomes the forum for a dispute where
State A's judgment must be recognized and given effect. But
State B cannot refuse to give effect to the State A judgment
based on public-policy objections. As the Supreme Court put it,
"[a] court may be guided by the forum State's 'public policy' in
determining the law applicable to a controversy. But our deci-
sions support no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith
and credit due judgments."129 However, the Court distinguished
between recognizing a judgment and enforcing that same judg-
ment: "Full faith and credit ... does not mean that States must
adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner,
and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures
do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects
do."130 Instead, forum law determines how a judgment shall be
enforced.
124 Id at 183.
125 See text accompanying notes 105-107.
126 Final judgments should not be confused with custody orders of the type protected
by the PKPA. A custody order typically is not a final judgment because it can be modified
at a later time by the court that issued it. The PKPA's requirement of full faith and credit
for custody orders does not flow directly from the Constitution; rather, it is federal statu-
tory law enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the implementing provision of Arti-
cle IV, Section 1.
127 522 US 222 (1998).
128 Id at 233.
129 Id.
130 Id at 235.
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Unlike marriage (which, as I explained above, is generally
assumed not to implicate the Full Faith and Credit Clause), an
adoption is finalized by a court judgment. And so, guided by the
principle that final judgments get maximal full faith and credit,
courts have routinely ruled that adoptions approved in one state
must be recognized in all states. 13 1 The Tenth Circuit applied
this rule in a 2007 case involving three same-sex couples and
their adopted children, and as recently as 2009, a commentator
could confidently assert that adoption was "the gold standard for
unassailable parental status between a nonbiological mother and
her child."132 Courts and commentators have assumed that a
state may not invoke its anti-gay public policy to refuse to recog-
nize an adoption involving a same-sex couple that was finalized
in another state. But a recent Fifth Circuit decision has cast un-
certainty on this principle and effected a split with the Tenth
Circuit on whether federal courts even have jurisdiction to hear a
plaintiff's complaint that one state refused to give full faith and
credit to another state's final judgment. I discuss the Tenth and
Fifth Circuit cases below.
a) Finstuen v Crutcher. In Finstuen v Crutcher,13 3 the
Tenth Circuit rejected the State of Oklahoma's position that the
state was not obligated to recognize out-of-state adoptions grant-
ed to individuals who were in same-sex relationships. The plain-
tiffs in Finstuen included families in which children had been
adopted in other states either jointly (that is, with both members
of a same-sex couple adopting and becoming parents at the same
time) or through second-parent adoption (where an individual
adopts a child who had been born to, or adopted in an earlier
proceeding by, a same-sex partner).134 Two of the plaintiff cou-
ples lived in Oklahoma with their adopted children; a third cou-
ple lived in Washington state but sought to have Oklahoma au-
thorities issue a new birth certificate for their Oklahoma-born
child. In 2004, Oklahoma legislators had approved a law that
provided, in pertinent part, that the state and its courts "shall
not recognize an adoption by more than one individual of the
131 See, for example, Embry vRyan, 11 So3d 408, 410 (Fla Ct App 2009) (holding that
Florida courts were required to give full faith and credit to a Washington adoption judg-
ment involving a same-sex couple).
132 Polikoff, 5 Stan J Civ Rts & Civ Liberties at 265 (cited in note 16).
133 496 F3d 1139 (10th Cir 2007).
134 Id at 1142-43.
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same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction."135 The
plaintiffs sued over the state's failure to recognize the "parent-
child relationships that are created by out-of-state adoptions." 136
The Tenth Circuit took note of what it called "a clear legisla-
tive expression of Oklahoma's public policy contrary to adoptions
by same sex couples." 137 Nonetheless, relying on Baker for the
proposition that "there is 'no roving "public policy exception" to
the full faith and credit due judgments,'"138 the court held that
"final adoption orders and decrees are judgments that are enti-
tled to recognition by all other states under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause."139 Of course, nothing in Finstuen requires a state
to grant adoptions to same-sex couples. But the decision meant
that same-sex couples who had been denied recognition of their
rights as adoptive parents could seek relief in the federal courts,
and the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause trumped a
state's statutory policy against recognition of such adoptions.
b) Adar v Smith. In Adar v Smith, 14 0 a male same-sex
couple, Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith, adopted a Louisiana-
born child, known as "Infant J," in a New York family court. Alt-
hough Adar and Smith do not live in Louisiana and apparently
do not plan to do so, they asked the Louisiana registrar of vital
records and statistics to change the child's Louisiana birth certif-
icate to reflect the names of his two new parents-a routine pro-
cedure after a child is adopted. The registrar balked. Although
Louisiana does not have a law like Oklahoma's barring recogni-
tion of out-of-state adoptions by same-sex couples, it does have a
law that restricts in-state joint adoptions to married couples.141
The state took the position that its adoption law prohibited the
registrar from naming two unmarried men on a birth certificate
as a child's parents. A Fifth Circuit panel ruled in 2010, in a de-
cision quite similar to Finstuen, that "Louisiana owes full faith
and credit to the New York adoption decree that declare[d]" the
two men to be the child's legal parents. 142
135 Id at 1148, quoting 10 Okla Stat § 7502-1.4(A).
136 Finstuen, 496 F3d at 1142.
137 Id at 1149 n 6.
138 Id at 1152, quoting Baker, 522 US at 233.
138 Finstuen, 496 F3d at 1156.
140 639 F3d 146 (5th Cir 2011) (en banc).
141 La Child Code Ann art 1221.
142 Adar v Smith, 597 F3d 697, 719 (5th Cir 2010).
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A deeply split en banc court reversed the panel decision. In-
voking the distinction between recognition and enforcement of
judgments,143 the majority opinion written by Chief Judge Edith
Jones said that Louisiana had not refused to recognize the adop-
tion. "The Registrar concedes that the parental relationship of
Adar and Smith with Infant J cannot be revisited in its courts,"
the court said, and "no right created by the New York adoption
order (i.e., right to custody, parental control, etc.) has been frus-
trated."144 But the court reasoned that, since Louisiana would not
issue a birth certificate naming two same-sex parents in an in-
state adoption, it was not required to do so for an out-of-state
adoption. "Obtaining a birth certificate," it said, "falls in the
heartland of enforcement, and therefore outside the full faith and
credit obligation of recognition."145 Here the court differed with
the Tenth Circuit, which saw changing a birth certificate to re-
flect new same-sex parents as part and parcel of recognizing
their parental rights.146
The Fifth Circuit went considerably further, though, and
reached a question that was not necessary to resolve the case:
whether a federal cause of action is even available to enforce the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. An en banc majority said it is not.
Although 42 USC § 1983 gives federal courts the power to hear
cases claiming violation of constitutional rights by state actors,147
the court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
"give[] rise to a right vindicable in a § 1983 action."148 It rea-
soned as follows: The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides "a
constitutional 'rule of decision' on state courts" to give res judica-
ta effect to other state courts' judgments.149 If a state court fails
to do so, the relief is an appeal to the state's higher courts (and
from there, ultimately to the Supreme Court), not a constitution-
al lawsuit in federal court under Section 1983.150 Given that "the
duty of affording full faith and credit to a judgment falls on
courts, it is incoherent to speak of vindicating full faith and cred-
it rights against non-judicial state actors," such as the Louisiana
143 See text accompanying note 130.
144 Adar, 639 F3d at 159.
145 Id at 160.
146 See Finstuen, 496 F3d at 1142 (declaring the Oklahoma non-recognition statute
unconstitutional and simultaneously "directing the issuance of a new birth certificate" for
the adopted child of one of the plaintiff couples).
147 See Monroe vPape, 365 US 167, 187 (1961).
148 Adar, 639 F3d at 153.
149 Id at 153-54, quoting Thompson v Thompson, 484 US 174, 182-83 (1988).
1so Adar, 639 F3d at 154.
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registrar.15' Thus, Adar and Smith's complaint against the regis-
trar should have been brought in a Louisiana court, since "full
faith and credit doctrine does not contemplate requiring an exec-
utive officer to 'execute' a foreign judgment without the interme-
diary of a state court."152 The Fifth Circuit's en banc decision
thus creates a split with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Finstuen
over whether the federal courts are available to enforce full faith
and credit for an adoption decree.153
c) Adoption: summing up. As a result of the circuit split
discussed above, federal law is now unclear on two important
points that affect gay and lesbian parents: whether "recognizing"
an adoption includes issuing the child a new birth certificate,
and whether a federal cause of action is available when adoptive
parents are denied recognition of their parental status in a dif-
ferent state.
The birth certificate question is important to the security of
the parent-child relationship because "[liack of an accurate birth
certificate makes a child vulnerable."154 As a leading gay rights
attorney explains,
[flor example, state agencies and employers often request
birth certificates to enroll a child for benefits. Many states
require parents to produce a birth certificate to law en-
forcement agencies to report a lost child and secure the
child's return, or to seek assistance in locating a kid-
napped child. If one parent dies and the other is not listed
on a child's birth certificate, the survivor may have trou-
ble establishing in various contexts that he or she is a
parent. Further, when parents break up, state agencies
commonly require birth certificates to obtain delinquent
child support. 155
Although Louisiana did not purport to deny recognition to
Adar and Smith's adoption of Infant J, its refusal to change the
child's birth certificate arguably denies recognition of their full
151 Id.
152 Id at 158, citing Riley vNY rust Co, 315 US 343, 349 (1942).
153 Attorneys for Adar and Smith filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court in July 2011.
154 Camilla Taylor, Accurate Birth Certificates Make Families Less Vulnerable, online
at http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/of-counsel/oc_201012_accurate-birth-certificates.h
tml (visited Sept 9, 2011).
155 Id.
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parental rights. At the very least, it is state action that disad-
vantages the couple vis-a-vis heterosexual adoptive parents and
makes their family less secure.
Even though the Tenth Circuit provided more protection for
families headed by same-sex couples, its decision nonetheless
illustrates the key shortcoming of the state interests paradigm:
its focus on state interests and its subordination of individual
interests. In Finstuen, Oklahoma was required under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to yield, not to any right on the part of
the plaintiffs to maintain their legal relationships to their chil-
dren, but rather to the sovereignty of its sister states that had
approved the various adoption decrees and embodied them in
final judgments. Of course, the end result was that the parents'
legal relationships with their children remained secure. But the
rationale for the decision rested on the respect that the Constitu-
tion required for the judgments as judgments. The substance of
the judgments was of no special relevance. A money judgment for
one dollar would get the same privileged treatment as an adop-
tion decree.
In holding that there is no federal cause of action for denial
of constitutional Full Faith and Credit, the Fifth Circuit put an
even sharper point on the matter. The Constitution may com-
mand state courts to give full faith and credit to other states'
judgments, but if those courts improperly deny full faith and
credit, "their rulings are not subject to declaratory or injunctive
relief in federal courts."156 A Section 1983 suit, the usual route to
vindication of constitutional rights in federal courts, is not avail-
able. The rights of parents as parents, and their interest against
the state in maintaining those rights, simply play no role in the
litigation.
D. The Effect of DONIA
One more reason why the rights of nonbiological gay and
lesbian parents remain uncertain is that same-sex couples are
singled out for disfavored legal treatment by the federal DOVA.
Scholars and litigants have disagreed over whether the federal
DOMA authorizes courts to disregard normal conflict of laws and
full faith and credit principles in cases involving legally married
gay or lesbian parents.
156 Adar, 639 F3d at 152.
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For example, some commentators have suggested that,
where same-sex couples are concerned, DOMA displaces the
PKPA and its mandate of full faith and credit for child custody
judgments.157 "Essentially, the argument is that while it may be
the case that parentage determinations normally must be re-
spected and honored by sister states, DOMA permits courts to
refuse to recognize a parentage determination when the case in-
volves a child born to a same-sex couple."15 8 If this interpretation
is correct, then "mini-DOMA states are permitted to ignore poli-
cies of comity and the best interest of the child because of their
worries about same-sex marriage."159 The result would be to en-
courage seize-and-run parental kidnapping behavior, "albeit only
in the context of same-sex divorce," leading to "greater confusion,
inconsistency, and conflict" in gay and lesbian family relation-
ships. 160
Other commentators have noted that, since DOMA by its
terms only applies to marriages, it would not affect legal parent-
age arising out of a civil union or domestic partnership.161 More-
over, while DOMA may permit states to refuse to recognize mar-
riages between same-sex couples, "there is nothing in the lan-
guage or history of DOMA that suggests it was intended to au-
thorize courts to depart from the usual rules that apply to judi-
cial orders about children born to and raised by these couples."162
Indeed, this was the conclusion of the Virginia Court of Appeals
in Miller-Jenkins, which rejected Lisa's argument that DOMA
trumped the PKPA. As that court saw the matter, it was not be-
ing asked to decide "whether Virginia recognizes the civil union
entered into by the parties in Vermont."163 "Rather, the only
question before" it was "whether, considering the PKPA, Virginia
can deny full faith and credit to the orders of the Vermont court
regarding I.M.J.'s custody and visitation. It cannot."lat
In summary, where a family is caught between the laws of
two states with different policies and attitudes toward same-sex
157 See Harvey, 78 Fordham L Rev at 1423-31 (cited in note 8).
158 Joslin, 70 Ohio St L J at 596 (cited in note 8).
159 Harvey, 78 Fordham L Rev at 1431 (cited in note 8).
160 Id.
161 See, for example, Joslin, 70 Ohio St L J at 596-97 (cited in note 8)
162 Id at 598.
163 Miller-Jenkins, 637 SE2d at 337.
164 Id.
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relationships and gay and lesbian parenting, traditional conflict
of laws doctrine and federal requirements of full faith and credit
provide at best uncertain and incomplete protection for gay and
lesbian parents' legal relationships with their children.
III. APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS TO THE
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
A. The State Interests Paradigm Cannot Adequately Protect
the Parent-Child Relationship
In Part II, I explained why the prevailing modes of analysis
for resolving interstate conflicts over parent-child relationships,
which I refer to collectively as the "state interests paradigm,"
cannot be relied upon to adequately protect the rights of non-
biological parents in same-sex relationships. Conflicts of law doc-
trine has not developed the principles necessary to deal with con-
temporary family configurations and controversies and is exces-
sively deferential to the forum state's public policy, even where
application of that public policy might mean summarily severing
a legal parent-child relationship that was established under the
law of another state. Where a parent-child relationship has been
established under the parentage presumption, the PKPA's feder-
al requirement of full faith and credit protects the relationship
only in custody litigation-assuming, that is, that the federal
DOMA does not place same-sex couples outside the protection of
the PKPA. As the Alabama Ex Parte NB. case indicates, it is
possible that a court might interpret its state law as being so un-
equivocally opposed to any form of same-sex relationship that
even another state's parentage order might not be respected. If
so, the aggrieved parent would have no cause of action in federal
court. Moreover, where a parent-child relationship was estab-
lished by adoption decree, the Adar case casts uncertainty over
what it means to "recognize" an adoption decree and whether a
federal cause of action is available for denial of a constitutional
(as opposed to statutory) command of full faith and credit.
Assuming that no one would dispute that a parent-child re-
lationship is of fundamental importance and should be protected,
the problem with these analytical frameworks is that they focus
only on state interests and relationships between states and give
no weight to the rights and interests of the affected individuals.
As Lea Brilmayer has written in a critique of prevailing conflicts
approaches, "[o]ne is hard put to find a serious discussion of
'rights' in the current academic literature or judicial discussions
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of choice of law. With a few notable exceptions, the academic talk
is all about 'policies,' or 'interests,' or 'functional analysis.'"
165
This is an important problem, Brilmayer argues, because
[clhoosing to talk in terms of rights rather than policies or
interests represents a fundamental jurisprudential com-
mitment which is reflected in the way that concrete prob-
lems are resolved. . .. Rights impose limits on state au-
thority, protecting individuals from being forced to sacri-
fice for the good of society as a whole. They reflect a no-
tion of individual desert that stands above the instrumen-
tal advantage to be achieved by the application of some
particular state's substantive law.166
It is important to be clear about what would happen if a
state purported to refuse to recognize a legal parent-child rela-
tionship that had been properly established under the law of an-
other state, either by adoption or the parentage presumption. For
all practical purposes, the state would be terminating parental
rights without due process, in violation of the rule laid down in
Santosky that such terminations require not only a hearing but
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit.67 Two
leading family law scholars also have made this argument.168
Acknowledging that refusal to recognize duly established paren-
tal rights effectively amounts to a termination of those rights
provides the predicate for my ultimate argument: that a court
must be guided in interstate litigation over parental rights pri-
marily by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not
by the state interests paradigm.
If someone is no longer recognized as her child's legal par-
ent, then she and the child become legal strangers to one anoth-
er, just as they do after a termination proceeding. The parent
165 Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice ofLaw, 98 Yale L J 1277, 1277 (1989).
166 Id at 1278.
167 See text accompanying notes 31-37.
168 Joan Hollinger writes that a state's refusal to recognize parental rights established
in another state "may ... be tantamount to an involuntary and unconstitutional termina-
tion of the rights and duties of one or both parents without proof of their unfitness." Joan
H. Hollinger, The Mobile Family: Interstate Jurisdictional Puzzles and Full Faith and
Credit for Adoption and Other Parentage Orders, 225 PLI/Crim 85, 117 (2010), citing
Santosky vKramer, 455 US 745, 753-54, 761 n 11, 765 (1982) and Stanley vllinois, 405
US 645, 651-53 (1972). And Nancy Polikoff writes that that, "if a different state refuses
to recognize [a] nonbiological mother's parentage, it is, in effect, terminating her parental
rights," an action that "is constitutionally impermissible without numerous substantive
and procedural safeguards." Polikoff, 5 Stan J Civ Rts & Civ Liberties at 264 (cited in
note 16).
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would have no legal right to make health care decisions for the
child, including emergency or end of life decisions. Nor could the
parent control schooling and education; consent to testing, im-
munizations, or psychological exams; or have the child excused
for religious observances or released into her custody by law en-
forcement officers. Accordingly, as Joan Hollinger writes, "[a]ny
rule or doctrine that would permit state courts to disregard adop-
tion decrees or other parentage determinations based on public
policy considerations would be extremely detrimental for chil-
dren."69 Because "[p]arental rights protect vital human inter-
ests," the termination of those rights "causes real psychological
and physical harm."170 Moreover, it would be "disruptive ... to
the social order if the status of parent and child were to come
and go as families move from one place to another or as a child
travels or moves with one parent, leaving the other behind in the
decree state."171 In light of "the need to ensure stability and final-
ity in family status, the trend of national and international law
has been toward universal recognition of adoptions and other
parentage orders granted by a court or other competent authori-
ty in the child's home jurisdiction."172
The plaintiffs in Finstuen actually briefed due process ar-
guments, though the Tenth Circuit, having decided the case on
the basis of full faith and credit, did not reach them.173 The par-
ents argued that, by refusing to recognize their adoptions, the
state was invading "[t]he private realm of the family" and "inter-
fering in the lives of these parents and families."174 Indeed,
[tihe interference here is strong. The litany of protections
provided to recognized parents and their children under
Oklahoma's statutory scheme is both far-reaching and
comprehensive. Additionally, by denying not only access
to these statutory protections, but also recognition that
they have legal parent-child relationships, the State has
effectively forced the adult plaintiffs to alter their up-
169 Hollinger, The Mobile Family at 117 (cited in note 168).
170 Donald C. Hubin, Parental lbghts and Due Process, 1 J L & Fam Stud 123, 141
(1999).
171 Hollinger, The Mobile Family at 117 (cited in note 168).
172 Id at 117-18.
173 496 F3d at 1156 ('Because we affirm the district court on this basis, we do not
reach the issues of whether the adoption amendment infringes on the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses.").
174 Appellees' Principal Brief, Finstuen v Crutcher, No 06-6213, *52-53 (10th Cir filed
Oct 16, 2006).
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bringing of their children to minimize risk. [Plaintiff]
Finstuen no longer signs parental authorizations for their
two girls. [Plaintiff] Jennifer Doel avoids making medical
decisions on behalf of her daughter E. The act's invasive
reach into the families' lives effectively sends the message
that these families are unwanted and, indeed, the Okla-
homa residents realize that they may be left with no other
choice but to move from Oklahoma for the safety and se-
curity of their children and themselves. 175
Allowing a state to effectively terminate parental rights
without due process would be both unconstitutional and intoler-
able. If Lynn Wardle is correct to conclude on the basis of an ex-
tensive historical survey that a forum state's public policy "is the
dominant, controlling consideration" when it is asked to recog-
nize a "controversial" form of family relationship,1 7 6 then we
must look beyond conflicts doctrine for sensible and humane
rules for interstate recognition of established parent-child rela-
tionships. Otherwise, the liberty and privacy interests inherent
in family relationships could always be trumped by the raw polit-
ical power of a state's insistence on the primacy of its own public
policy.
B. Established Due Process Principles Require Interstate
Recognition of Legal Parent-Child Relationships, However
Formed
Given that constitutionally protected liberty and privacy in-
terests are implicated when courts decide whether a parent-child
relationship should be recognized across state lines, the parental
rights and family autonomy principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment, rather than conflicts or full faith and credit doc-
trines, generally should guide the resolution of such cases. The
simple rule should be that legal parenthood, once properly estab-
lished under one state's law, is a legal status that endures unless
and until it is terminated in a proceeding that satisfies the
standards of due process as specified by the Supreme Court.'77 If
a child is born to a same-sex couple in a marriage, civil union, or
domestic partnership, and if the state that creates the couple's
relationship considers both parties to be the child's legal parents,
175 Id at 53.
176 See text accompanying notes 94-95.
177 See text accompanying notes 31-37.
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then the non-biological parent cannot later be deprived of that
status by another state, absent a proper proceeding and clear
and convincing evidence of unfitness. Similarly, if a court grants
an adoption to an individual who happens to be gay or lesbian or
in a same-sex relationship, that person remains the child's legal
parent unless and until she is adjudicated to be unfit. Legal-
parent status is not dependent on whether the forum state dis-
approves of the type of family the adoption decree created. The
public policy exception may allow a state to refuse to recognize a
marriage that was created in another state because no federal
court has yet questioned the constitutionality of applying a mini-
DOMA to terminate an existing same-sex marriage. But the well-
established protections of the Due Process Clause for parental
rights mean that there can be no such exception to the interstate
recognition of a parent-child relationship that was established
under the laws of another state.
My argument that constitutional due process protects legal-
parent status would be a departure from the analytical frame-
works of the state interests paradigm, but it is a natural applica-
tion of the Supreme Court's parental rights and family privacy
doctrine. At the core of that doctrine is the principle that
"[cihoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of chil-
dren are among associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of
basic importance in our society,' rights sheltered by the Four-
teenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation,
disregard, or disrespect."7 8 As David Meyer has argued, a
"state's relegation of some relationships to a disfavored and dis-
advantaged legal status might rightly be understood as actively
destabilizing those relationships, triggering constitutional scru-
tiny."179 He explained,
[b]y privileging marriage and legal parenthood as unique-
ly valuable and legitimate family relations, government
enhances the stability, depth, and prestige of those bonds
while simultaneously discounting and denigrating the
status of informal alternatives. The differentiation may be
perfectly justifiable. The point, however, is that the state's
withholding of formal recognition from those who are oth-
erwise prepared to accept the roles those legal institutions
17a ML.B. v S.L.J, 519 US 102, 116 (1996), quoting Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US
371, 376 (1971) (citations omitted).
179 David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right to Public Recognition of Family Relationships?
The Cases ofMarriage and Adoption, 51 Vill L Rev 891, 919 (2006).
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require and provide might rightly be seen as a form of in-
tervention undermining their family relations, squarely
within the compass of even a purely negative conception
of the right of privacy.180
Other scholars similarly have suggested that interstate dis-
putes over gay/lesbian parenting implicate constitutional princi-
ples, though they have not elaborated on the argument. For ex-
ample, Nancy Polikoff writes that, "if a different state refuses to
recognize [a] nonbiological mother's parentage, it is, in effect,
terminating her parental rights," an action that "is constitution-
ally impermissible without numerous substantive and procedural
safeguards."181 Gillian Metzger, noting that Section 2 of the fed-
eral Defense of Marriage Act provides that states are not re-
quired to recognize same-sex marriage by virtue of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, writes that "[t]o the extent DOMA's Section 2
is used to deny recognition to an out-of-state custody decree, it
might also violate substantive due process protections of paren-
tal and family rights."182 And another commentator writing on
the perilous nature of same-sex couples' parentage rights argues
that, "[iun appreciation of the diversity and complexity of family
life, and the great constitutional regard for family privacy, the
fundamental rights of a parent should evolve to include protec-
tions for the particular family relationship at stake."183
Disadvantaging a child because the state does not want to
recognize her parents' relationship may implicate the child's own
constitutional rights as well.184 The Ninth Circuit has observed
that a "child's interest in her relationship with a parent is suffi-
ciently weighty by itself to constitute a cognizable liberty inter-
est."185 Justice Stevens also expressed the view that it is "likely"
that children have "liberty interests in preserving established
familial or family-like bonds." 8 6 And aside from constitutional
180 Id at 913 (citation omitted).
181 Polikoff, 5 Stan J Civ Rts & Civ Liberties at 264 (cited in note 16).
182 Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv L Rev
1468, 1536 n 282 (2007).
183 Gonzalez, Comment, 23 St Thomas L Rev at 317 (cited in note 6).
184 See, for example, Graham, 48 Santa Clara L Rev at 1033-34 (cited in note 9) (ob-
serving that laws that "make it impossible for a child to be legally connected with both
parents" who are in a same-sex relationship may "discriminate[] against a class of chil-
dren in an [unconstitutional] manner").
185 Smith v City of Fontana, 818 F2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir 1987), overruled on other
grounds by Hodgers-Duran vLopez, 199 F3d 1037, 1040 n 1 (9th Cir 1999).
186 Thoxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 88 (Stevens dissenting).
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concerns, it should be clear that continuity of legal parenthood
almost always will best promote a child's well-being. 187
Against the weight of the substantial protection the Court
has given to family relationships and the high bar it has set for
termination of parental rights, a state could not justify severing
established legal bonds between a non-biological parent and her
child merely because that state maintained a policy that hetero-
sexual homes and relationships were preferable. This is especial-
ly so given that "[tihere is no scientific basis for concluding that
lesbian mothers or gay fathers are unfit parents on the basis of
their sexual orientation" and that "results of research suggest
that lesbian and gay parents are as likely as heterosexual par-
ents to provide supportive and healthy environments for their
children."88 In Moore v City of East Cleveland 89 a leading case
on family privacy and autonomy, the Supreme Court struck
down a city zoning ordinance that would have prevented a
grandmother from living under the same roof with her grand-
children. The plurality opinion forcefully admonished that, when
government "undertakes such intrusive regulation of the fami-
ly[,] ... the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappro-
priate."190 While the family is not beyond regulation, "when the
government intrudes on choices concerning family living ar-
rangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance
of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which
they are served by the challenged regulation." 191 Moore might not
require a court to "creat[e] a new family unit where none existed
before," but it should be properly understood to prohibit the state
from "breaking up an existing family unit."192
187 See, for example, Christy M. Buchanan and Parissa L. Jahromi, A Psychological
Perspective on Shared Custody Arrangements, 43 Wake Forest L Rev 419, 420 n 3 ("Con-
tinuity of care and routines also promote the well-being of children."); Oren Goldhaber,
Note, 'I Want My Mommies" the Cry for Mini-DOM~s to Recognize the Best Interests of
the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 45 Fam Ct Rev 287, 296 (2007) (arguing that
"[c]hildren of same-sex couples should not be included in a public policy against same-sex
couples if doing so will hinder the child's physical and psychological well-being and
growth").
188 American Psychological Association Policy Statement: Sexual Orientation, Par-
ents, & Children, online at http://www.apa.org/about/governance/council/policy/parent
ing.aspx (visited Sept 9, 2011).
189 431 US 494 (1977) (Powell) (plurality).
190 Id at 499.
191 Id.
192 Mullins v Oregon, 57 F3d 789, 794 (9th Cir 1995).
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The Moore opinion drew on the line of substantive due pro-
cess and privacy cases from Meyer through Roe v Wade,193 which
it described as collectively standing for the principle that "free-
dom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is
one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause."194 Re-
jecting the defendant city's narrow readings of these cases, the
plurality described them as building blocks of a broad, compre-
hensive doctrine that was founded on the "basic values that un-
derlie our society."195 The Court recognized that
these cases did not expressly consider the family relation-
ship presented here. They were immediately concerned
with freedom of choice with respect to childbearing, or
with the rights of parents to the custody and companion-
ship of their own children, or with traditional parental
authority in matters of child rearing and education. But
unless we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain
rights associated with the family have been accorded shel-
ter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale
of these precedents to the family choice involved in this
case.196
Similarly, while the Moore court may not have seen same-
sex parenting on the horizon, the opinion's logic supports a rule
that states may not nullify a legal-parent status that has been
granted in another state without good cause. "[T]he usual judi-
cial deference to the legislature is inappropriate" where a state
"undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family" and seeks to
deny "freedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life" by
"forcing all to live in narrowly defined family patterns."'
David Meyer has warned against overreading the Court's
family privacy cases, noting that despite their strong rhetoric,
"the Court has been pragmatic, tacitly adjusting its scrutiny in
light of the magnitude of the state's intrusion and the strength of
the state's regulatory interests,"98 especially where the cases
involved tension "between private and communal interests in
1es 410 US 113 (1973).
194 Moore, 431 US at 499.
195 Id at 503.
196 Id at 500-01 (citations omitted).
197 Id at 499-506.
198 David D. Meyer, The Paradox ofFamily Privacy, 53 Vand L Rev 527, 529 (2000).
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childrearing."199 But if a court refused to recognize the legal rela-
tionship between a child and a fit parent merely because the re-
lationship had been established in another state, the court could
hardly be said to be upholding some valid state regulatory inter-
est aimed at protecting the child's welfare. Refusing to validate
the relationship would be nothing more than an assertion of
state power in the service of a governing majority's disapproval
toward gay or lesbian relationships.
The fact that the parent-child relationship at stake may
have been created by operation of state law, rather than biology,
does not alter the constitutional protection to which it is entitled.
The Supreme Court made this clear in the Michael H case,
where it actually overrode the interests of a biological father and
extended a shield of substantive due process protection around a
family relationship that consisted of mother, child, and the
mother's husband, who was deemed a presumptive parent under
state law.2 0 0 In Michael H, the Court did not privilege tradition-
alism in the definition of a family per se; rather, it provided pro-
tection to families that have been legally recognized as such un-
der a state's law. "Justice Scalia announced that the Court has
been protecting the sanctity of the family and the interpersonal
relationships that develop within the family and not per se pro-
tecting biological relationships."201 He further recognized that in
Stanley v Illinois, 202 a Due Process Clause case protecting the
right of an unwed father to maintain custody of his children after
the mother's death, the Court "forbade the destruction of ... a
family."203 Due process protects the "unitary family" and the "re-
lationships that develop within" such families.204 And so, if a
state deems two men or two women and their child to be a "uni-
tary family" under its laws, then such a family may claim the
same constitutional protections that the Court described in Mi-
chaelH
The result in Michael H is consistent with a principle the
Court noted in an earlier case-that "[n]o one would seriously
dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship be-
tween an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in
199 Id at 545.
200 See text accompanying notes 38-42.
201 Philip S. Welt, Adoption and the Constitution: Are Adoptive Parents Really
"Strangers Without Rights". Ann Surv Am L 165, 203 (1995).
202 405 US 645 (1972).
203 Michael H., 491 US at 123.
204 Id.
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the absence of blood relationship."2 05 The essence of a family re-
lationship "stems from the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association."206
To be sure, a constitutional rule requiring a state to recog-
nize a parent-child relationship that it would not have created
involves some infringement on that state's sovereignty. But it is
a necessary infringement given the reality that modern families
expect to be able to move freely from state to state without fear
that their legal relationships will be in jeopardy. The rule also
would prevent states from elevating anti-gay public policies in a
way that would distort "[t]he most important policy underlying
the law of parentage[, which] is to ensure that children have at
least one, and preferably two, legal parents who are responsible
for their care and support."207
Federalism in family law, as in any other area where states
are given the primary role to regulate human activities, "is an
important constitutional value ... but the United States is a sin-
gle nation, and the fundamental rights of our citizens," such as
the parent-child relationship, "are properly defined and protected
as a matter of national constitutional law."2 0 8 Federalism cannot
tolerate one state taking the position that a legal parent-child
relationship established under the laws of another state was
somehow void ab initio. The approach I have outlined would not
force any state to create a legal family relationship of which it
disapproves. It would "defer to the states in the prescription of
the substance of core family law relationships."209 But it would
provide a role for federal law and federal courts to "proscrib[e]
constitutional violations and other unwarranted state intrusions
on personal autonomy" by preventing a state from severing a le-
gal family relationship without cause. 210 It thereby would "facili-
tate diverse approaches to family law issues, subject to judicial
checks on state power."211 Deployed to protect an extant legal
205 Smith v Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816, 844
(1977).
206 Id.
207 Gonzalez, Comment, 23 St Thomas L Rev at 308 (cited in note 6) (quotation marks
and citations omitted).
208 Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 NC L Rev 63, 94-
95 (2006).
209 Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question., 66 Wash & Lee L
Rev 131, 201 (2009).
210 Id.
211 Id. See also June Carbone and Naomi Cahn, Judging Families, 77 UMKC L Rev
267, 269 (2008) (observing that although "different parts of the country are experiencing
cultural change at different speeds," federal "courts can-and should-play a mediating
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family relationship against the coercive power of a state that dis-
approves of the relationship and believes it should never have
been formed, the use of due process I suggest actually "serves a
conserving function, furthering stability in the law and protect-
ing societal expectations concerning individual freedom."212
Constitutional rules that cabin the discretion of state courts
to interpret and apply their own states' laws also run some risk
of infringing on values of majoritarian self-government. But any
state law or judicial interpretation that would purport to sever
an existing legal parent-child relationship without good cause
would not be worthy of respect under our deepest legal and polit-
ical traditions. Indeed, under the common law, "both English and
American judges view[ed] the origins of parental rights as being
even more fundamental than property rights," and it is for the
protection of such rights that "government is formed."213 Finally,
as the Supreme Court has admonished, "a state interest in
standardizing its children and adults, making the 'private realm
of family life' conform to some state-designed ideal, is not a legit-
imate state interest at all."2 14
IV. CONCLUSION
States differ in their laws regarding same-sex relationships.
States also differ in their policies toward parentage and assisted
reproduction. But states do not differ on the principle that the
parent-child relationship is of profound importance, both to fami-
lies and the larger society; and the Supreme Court has enshrined
this principle in a clear and well-established line of due process
jurisprudence.
With the prospect now emerging that states might not rec-
ognize the rights of gay or lesbian parents when they cross state
lines, it is time to acknowledge that the parent-child relationship
is too important to be left to the state interests paradigm. Paren-
tal rights are individual rights, and individual rights must be
vindicated not through doctrines of conflict of laws or full faith
and credit, but under the constitutional guarantee of "freedom of
personal choice in matters of family life"2 15 and the principle that
role that articulates and helps solidify changing cultural understandings").
212 Conkle, 85 NC L Rev at 95 (cited in note 208).
213 Bruce C. Hafen, Children 's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reserva-
tions About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights, "1976 BYU L Rev 615-16 (1976).
214 Hodgson v Minnesota, 497 US 417, 452 (1990).
215 Santosky, 455 US at 753.
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a state may not impose on any family without good cause "the
irretrievable destruction of their family life."216
216 Id.
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